清末立宪运动中的两院制问题

The Bicameralism in Late Qing Constitutional Reform

摘要:

国会两院制在 20 世纪初以前的宪法实践中居于主流地位, 具体可分为贵族式、 联邦式及民选 式三种类型。 其主要功能在于代表社会中的特殊团体, 促进议事审慎, 限制民选议院专断。 清末各政治势力 均偏好两院制。 清末未成立的正式议会确定将采用两院制, 而预备立宪阶段成立的资政院在经过官制改革、 都察院改下议院等阶段后, 最终被界定为准贵族式两院制。 资政院的议员构成既有模仿日本之处, 亦体现了 清末中国独特的民族问题。 最终, 由于落实两院制不彻底, 资政院未能发挥两院制功能, 清王朝灭亡前后将 未来的正式议会改为民选式两院制。

Abstract:

In early 20th century，bicameralism was accepted by most of constitutional polities. It was presented in three different forms: Aristocratic Model，Federal Model，and Democratically Selected Model. The functions of bicameralism include representing multiple societal forces and guaranteeing cautiousness of the parliament，by setting up a reexamining mechanism in decision-making procedure. In the late Qing constitutional reform movement，bicameralism was the desirable parliament form for every political force. Therefore，the empire_’s formal parliament was designed as bicameral. Before the parliamen_’s formation，the Qing government had planned to build a preparatory parliament，Political Consultative Council (Zi Zheng Yuan，资政院)，which was a sole entity，yet with bicameral element. Some officials suggested to establish Political Consultative Council only as preparatory House of Lords，and transform Chief Surveillance Office (Du Cha Yuan，都察院) into preparatory House of Representatives. Though such bicameralism advice was denied，Political Consultative Council was finally designed as a quasi-bicameral parliament. Half of its members were chosen by the emperor，which resembled Aristocratic House of Lords，and the other half were elected by representatives in Provincial Assembly (Zi Yi Ju，谘议局). Political Consultative Council’s quasi-bicameralism is similar to Meiji Japan’s parliamentary configuration in two ways. First，the types of Political Consultative Council’s emperor-choosing members and the types of members of Japan_’s House of Lords were alike. And more importantly，constraining elected representatives was their major function in common. Leaving aside those similarities，Political Consultative Council_’s quasi-bicameralism has its unique function of strengthening the relationship among ethnic groups in the empire. Within emperor-choosing members，there were fixed seats reserved for borderland ethnic lords，and the number of Manchu and Han members were balanced. Political Consultative Council did not achieve its goal of constraining elected members. On its first annual meeting，it passed several resolutions，which seriously challenged the legitimacy of the regime，and the emperor_’s ruling. Though the reasons were complicated，at least on the institutional level，the failure of Political Consultative Council_’s quasi-bicameralism could be attributed to its form as a sole entity. Unlike the bicameral parliament，where members of two houses meet separately，the emperor-choosing and elected members of Advisory Parliament meet in same assembly place，which made it difficult for the emperor_’s ministers to motivate emperor-choosing lords to object to elected members. However，since the elected members were generally quite radical，it is unlikely to constrain them easily，even if they and lord members were separated as a typical bicameral parliament. Before its being overthrown，the Qing government changed its design of future parliament from Aristocratic Bicameralism to Democratically Selected Bicameralism，in response to the threatening request of a group of military officers. Such change reflected a more general transformation from an empire to a republic state.