美国撤离部分驻韩美军决策研究 (1969—1971)

A Study on the Nixon Administration’s Intention to Withdraw Some of the US. Troops Stationed in South Korea

摘要:

尼克松政府撤离部分驻韩美军, 是其全球缓和大战略的需要。 为此, 美国国家安全委员会出台 NSSM 27 文件, 研究从韩国撤军的可行性。 由于需要和盟友韩国磋商, 加之美国军方的反对以及需要说服国 会批准对韩援助, 美国迟迟未就撤军问题做出决策。 但随着美韩各自国内情况的变化, 美国国家安全委员会 加快了决策步伐, 其下属项目分析智囊部为尼克松政府的最终决策提供了建设性的意见, 并拟订了具有决策 性质的 NSDM 48 文件。 尽管韩国强烈反对, 但它根本无法改变尼克松政府调整对朝鲜半岛政策的决心。 部 分驻韩美军的撤走, 对 1970 年代初朝鲜半岛局势大幅度缓和产生了积极影响。

Abstract:

Since the Kennedy administration，the United States has been interested in reducing the size of US. forces in Korea. However，this idea was not put into practice until Nixon became president. In order to reduce the huge increase in US. defense spending as a result of the Vietnam War and to prevent ROK from attacking DPRK without consulting the United States and dragging US. forces into another ground war in Asia，Nixon began work on the withdrawal of some US. troops in Korea as soon as he took office. On Feb22，1969，he prepared a major document on the Korean Peninsula，National Security Study Memorandum No27 (NSSM 27)，to study the feasibility of withdrawing troops from Korea. However，this work progressed very slowly. There were two main reasons for this. First，ROK，a US. ally，strongly opposed the plan to reduce US. troops stationed there; second，there were serious differences within the Nixon administration，especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff，which strongly opposed the withdrawal of some US. troops in ROK. In addition，the Nixon administration needed to consider how to persuade Congress to provide military and economic aid to the South Koreans to meet ROK_’s demands. Therefore，the most critical reason for the delay in Washington policymaking to consider and make a decision on the NSSM 27 document study，according to the relevant files declassified by the US. government，was the existence of different opinions within the Nixon administration on the contents of the report. In particular，the strong opposition of the US. military，represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff，to parts of the NSSM 27 prevented a smooth decision on withdrawal from being made. The differences between the memorandum submitted by Lt. Gen. Unger on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the memorandum submitted by Lynn on behalf of the National Security Council_’s Program Analysis Staff were mainly due to the lack of agreement on the number and size of withdrawals and the number of Korean troops to be modernized and improved. However，the Lynn Memorandum had an important influence on Nixon_’s decision. The core of the document had three main points: first，to consult with ROK to inform President Park Chung-hee of President Nixon_’s intentions and to discuss with him the timing and terms of withdrawal; second，to confirm the reduction of US. troops in Korea by 20，000 by the end of May 1971 and to provide ROK with $200 million in annual military aid for the 1971-1975 fiscal year; third，when a large number of ROK troops are withdrawn from Vietnam or when the ROK Army modernization and improvement program is well underway，further withdrawal of US. troops may be considered. Although ROK strongly opposed the option of partial withdrawal of US. troops in Korea，it simply could not change the Nixon administration_’s determination to adjust its policy toward the Korean Peninsula. The partial withdrawal of US. forces in Korea had a positive impact on the substantial de-escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the early 1970s.